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Abstract 
Despite the proliferation of academic research on information systems 
outsourcing, not many studies analyze the characteristics of outsourcing contracts. This 
research aims to provide an in-depth description of information systems outsourcing. 
An additional objective is to examine how these characteristics evolve over time. 
Finally, this study reports on the usefulness of measuring such characteristics over time 
to assess the maturity level of the information systems outsourcing. This study gathers 
the data from the responses of the information systems managers of the largest Spanish 
firms to a questionnaire. This longitudinal study covers 12 years of research and 
compares authors’ previous research results with the results of this study.  
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1.         Introduction 
Although extensive academic research exists on information 
systems/information technologies (IS/IT) outsourcing, few studies focus on the 
characteristics of outsourcing contracts. Researchers very often address outsourcing as a 
set of homogeneous services and do not analyze the outsourcing of specific activities. 
This study offers a comprehensive description of IT outsourcing through the responses 
to a survey of the IS managers of the most important Spanish firms. This research also 
draws on Cullen et al.’s theoretical scheme (2005) about the essence of outsourcing 
contracts (i.e., outsourcing configuration). The method section delves into techniques 
and empirical work, along with the most important outcomes of this research. This 
research offers a longitudinal comparison of the results of this study and the previous 
research. 
 
2.         IS outsourcing configuration 
Outsourcing configuration refers to a high-level, comprehensive description of a 
set of structural decisions that firms adopt while organizing outsourcing agreements. 
That configuration includes a thorough analysis of outsourcing agreements. According 
to Cullen et al. (2005), the attributes that define an outsourcing relationship are: (1) 
Relationship scope, which includes the contract’s financial scale or magnitude; (2) 
number of providers; (3) price structure; (4) contract duration; (5) resource ownership; 
(6) commercial relationship between client and provider. 
 (1) The relationship scope and the financial scale deal with the description of 
the outsourced services (e.g. development, programming, maintenance, etc.), with 
whom the addressees of such services are (i.e., the whole firm, one or several divisions, 
one or several departments, etc.), with the geographical scope of contracts (whether 
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providers are national or foreign), and with the financial magnitude or degree of 
outsourcing; that is, whether total or selective outsourcing applies.  
Thus, making a very careful selection of the IS functions firms want to outsource 
is very important. A function must be: not excessively complex or strategically critical 
for the business, well understood and under control before the outsourcing, and 
available in the competitive market at an equally competitive price (Fisher et al., 2008). 
Furthermore, firms are more prone to outsource IT functions if the latter have little 
specificity, if measuring them is not too problematic, and if transactions do not occur 
very often (Ali & Green, 2012; Thouin et al., 2009).  
In addition, a growing tendency to look for providers in foreign countries exists 
(Peslak, 2012). Although a certain pressure exists in several western countries such as 
the United States, the United Kingdom, or France to slow down this movement towards 
offshore outsourcing, some studies (Khan & Lacity, 2012) reveal that firms, in fact, plan 
to continue with their offshore policy.  
Regarding outsourcing degree, total insourcing allows the firm to own the IS 
infrastructure and to assume the responsibility for delivering services to users. The firm 
has employees who are in charge of providing IS services, with little involvement of 
external parties.  
Selective outsourcing allows external providers to complement IS internal 
capabilities. Even though the firm has an almost total control over IS services, the firm 
can subcontract an external provider for specific IS activities (Gulla & Gupta, 2012).  
Total outsourcing means that the client firm has a low IS asset ownership rate 
and the seller has an agreement to deliver certain service levels to clients. The client 
firm receives an IS service without having to worry about the practical aspects of the 
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creation of that service. Lacity et al. (1996) claim that total outsourcing takes place if 
the client spends over 80% of its computing budget on IS outsourcing. 
Previous studies suggest IS selective outsourcing as a better option than total 
insourcing or total outsourcing (Lacity et al., 1996; Lee et al., 2004; Shi, 2010; 
Väyrynen & Kinnula, 2012).  
(2) Number of providers. Having only one provider is excessively risky, because 
that provider’s negotiation power increases, which keeps the client with no capacity to 
react in case of bad service. Having multiple providers depending on their knowledge 
and skills is interesting (Leem & Lee, 2004), but the firm would also need to consider 
the coordination costs resulting from having to deal with all the providers (Currie & 
Willcocks, 1998). Selective outsourcing with several IT providers turns out to be 
suitable when the outsourced activities are not interdependent (Kishore et al., 2003).  
(3) Price structure can be either fixed or dependent on the services the firm 
receives, or based on costs. Because many online sourcing markets for the development 
of online software services often fix prices, the client already knows the price of 
outsourcing (Gefen & Carmel, 2013). Nevertheless, these fixed prices somehow go 
against the philosophy of outsourcing because outsourcing is a tool for transforming 
fixed costs into variable ones. Contracts that depend on performance or on the service 
units that the firm receives (e.g., number of payrolls that the provider processes) 
guarantee flexibility, because the outsourcing party only pays for what the firm receives 
(Gellings, 2007). The third option consists in making the price depend on the costs that 
the provider has to assume to deliver the services to the client. However, this option 
may lead the provider to adopt an opportunistic position by disproportionately inflating 
costs (Lacity & Willcocks, 1995).  
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(4) Contract duration. Previous research highlights that short contracts are most 
common in successful outsourcing solutions (Gellings, 2007). Numerous authors, 
additionally, state that short contracts allow more flexibility to the client, who can look 
for another provider if the service is not satisfactory (Currie, 1998; Earl, 1996). In any 
case, the controversy between short-term or long-term contracts still exists. For 
example, authors such as Kepler and Jones (1998) argue that long-term contracts permit 
a mutual agreement between the parties as well as reciprocal learning. 
(5) Resource ownership. The complexity of the outsourcing decision requires the 
correct definition of the owner the resources resulting from the outsourcing (i.e., 
hardware, software, and even working hours) (Dibbern et al., 2004). This complexity 
also requires specifying where the provider will implement their services (i.e., at the 
provider’s or at the client’s facilities). Providers very often move their own workers to 
the client firms, thus creating work and trust ties between the staff of both firms, which 
means that the client and the provider must focus on the complementariness of their 
resources so that both firms create synergies (Wang et al., 2008).  
(6) Commercial relationship between client and provider. That relationship can 
vary greatly because service providers may have different degrees of responsibility and 
ownership over their clients’ IT. Such relationships can range from total independence 
with the possibility of sharing some business or ownership initiatives (as in the event 
that the client should own a part of the provider’s capital), to a very strong dependence 
(e.g. when the provider is an affiliate or subsidiary company of the client). These 
relationships very often depend on the level of outsourcing (Kishore et al., 2003).  
 
3.         Method 
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This study uses the directory Las 5.000 Mayores Empresas [The 5,000 Largest 
Firms] of the magazine Actualidad Económica—later collated with Duns & Bradstreet’s 
database Las 50.000 Principales Empresas Españolas [The 50,000 most important 
Spanish firms]—to determine the study population. The study left out 45 firms that 
shared address and telephone number with others, which suggested that those firms 
were affiliates or subsidiaries. The remaining 4955 firms received a questionnaire in 
two formats, first electronic and then in paper. The valid responses amounted to 398 
(8.03%). 
This study, which is a part of a wider research on different aspects of IS 
outsourcing, uses 12 out of the 28 survey questions available. 3 of these questions 
define the firms’ characteristics, the firms’ IS departments, and the firms’ managers; the 
remaining 9 questions deal with IS outsourcing configuration (i.e., characteristics of 
outsourcing contracts and relationships). 
For the 9 questions about outsourcing configuration, this study draws on Cullen 
et al.’s study (2005). Because these 9 questions measure different characteristics of the 
same concept, the study analyzes the questions joint Cronbach’s alpha, which is 0.79, 
thus confirming the reliability of this scale. The survey addressees were the firms’ Chief 
Information Officer (CIO).  
Table 1 shows the study’s technical specifications. This study analyzes the 
evolution of the interviewees’ answers over time through three different surveys. Table 
1 reflects the information both from the most recent survey and from the two previous 
ones. However, whether the firms that answered the questionnaire and the preceding 
ones are the same is impossible to ascertain. Previous longitudinal studies (e.g., 
Casadesús & Karapetrovic, 2005) also focus on the same population. The profile of 
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firms answering is representative of the total population in terms of size (i.e., firms with 
the highest turnover) and activity sector.  
Table 1 here. 
 
4.        Results 
4.1.     Relationship scope 
Table 2 here. 
Only 54 firms (13.6%) do not outsource, whereas 344 (86.4%) do outsource 
nationally or internationally. The Chi-square statistic shows that the variables indicating 
outsourcing levels are independent. This independence owes to the firms’ ability to 
outsource internationally regardless of their level of national outsourcing and vice versa. 
However, according to the 2006 survey, firms do not outsource internationally without 
outsourcing nationally. The 2001 survey only asked whether firms outsource, without 
specifying if the outsourcing was national or international.  
Table 3 here. 
Table 3 shows the evolution of outsourcing over time: the percentage of firms 
that outsource grows because firms outsource nationally less than before, but many 
more firms outsource internationally. Furthermore, in 2006, 16.4% of firms did not 
outsource either nationally or internationally; in the last survey that figure decreases to a 
13.6%. 
Figure 1 offers the outsourcing percentages for the different IS activities. The 
figure represents the percentages by stretches from 1 to 5; where 1 means that the 
outsourcing level is below 20%; 2 means that the level is between 20 and 40%; 3 
between 40 and 60%; 4 between 60 and 80%; and 5 represents that the outsourcing level 
is above 80%. 
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Figure 1 here. 
Figure 1 shows that the mean outsourcing percentage for the different activities 
is below 50% except for hardware maintenance. These results support previous surveys’ 
findings: firms continue to perform what Lacity et al. (1996) call selective outsourcing.  
The activities appearing most frequently in outsourcing by order of importance 
according to this 2013 survey are: hardware maintenance, software maintenance, 
programming, and system installation. These 4 activities coincide with those in the two 
preceding surveys. 
In addition, Figure 1 shows an increase from previous surveys in the outsourcing 
levels for all activities, save for hardware maintenance, which is in line with Table 3 
data. The largest Spanish firms outsource mainly at firm level. Firms do not outsource 
to the same extent at a division level; and outsourcing at a department level is even less 
common. In this case, these results follow the trend of the 2006 survey. This study uses 
the Chi-square to calculate the statistical dependence between the year in which the 
survey takes place and the type of addressee. The results show that these elements are 
non-dependent, which means that no significant difference exists between the different 
surveys’ results (Chi-square equals 1.80; significance equals 0.407). 
 
4.2.      Number of providers 
Firms continue to look for several providers in most of the activities that they 
outsource. However, Figure 2 shows that the tendency to look for several providers is 
stronger in the past surveys than in the 2013 survey for most of the computer activities.  
Figure 2 here. 
 
4.        Price structure 
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Figure 3 reflects the price structure preference in contracts on a 1-to-5 Likert 
scale. 1 would represent the least frequent price structure, and 5 the most frequent one. 
The contracts where the price stems from service cost occupy the last position in the 
ranking, which makes clear that firms prefer fixed-price contracts and service-unit-
dependent contracts. 
Figure 3 here. 
Price-structure results are similar to the 2006 survey results, with the exception 
of differences between these three fixing prices methods is not so significant as in 
previous years.  
 
4.4.  Contract duration 
Figure 4 here. 
Figure 4 shows the percentages of variation in contract duration over the 
different surveys. The results are consistent throughout the surveys: most firms prefer 
contracts of up to one year, contracts between 1 and 5 years are second in place, and, in 
third place, open-ended contracts (because duration depends on each project) are in 
third place. The longest contracts, those lasting between 5 and 10 years, and those with 
duration above 10 years are in the last places. However, the results of the last survey 
show a small difference in firm preferences: although firms still prefer short-term 
contracts, firms are not as reluctant to long-lasting contracts as in the past.  
A non-parametric test reveals that the means are different in every variable, 
every year. Thus, this study cannot statistically assure that the means/variables follow 
the same pattern and, in fact, this statistical difference confirms the change of behavior 
in the contract duration variables. 
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4.5. Resource ownership 
Figure 5 here. 
This study asks the interviewees to assess the outsourced activities on a scale of 
1 to 7 with regard to whether their firms implement the outsourced activities with their 
own resources (i.e., hardware and software) or using those of service providers, and 
whether such outsourced activities take place in their own facilities or in those of 
providers. Firms clearly prefer using their own resources, as 2013 and 2006 surveys 
show. 
 
4.6.  Commercial relationship 
Figure 6 here. 
No significant variation exists in the firms’ preference for a type of commercial 
relationship from 2006 to 2013. The firms acting as providers and clients of the 
outsourced services are still separate entities. Although some firms have joint initiatives, 
the cases in which a client owns a part of the provider’s capital or that provider is a 
subsidiary or affiliate of the client firm are much less frequent. Student’s t-distribution 
confirms the absence of significant means differences between variables’ data for 2006 
and 2013. These results, in turn, confirm their similar behavior over these two periods 
(Student’s T values for separate organizations, joint initiatives, capital owner and 
subsidiary or affiliate are 0.97, -0.37, -1.39 and -1.46, with the corresponding 
significance levels: 0.33, 0.71, 0.16, 0.14). 
 
5.         Conclusions 
A widespread growth of outsourcing has taken place in recent years. The results 
of this study indicate that this period is a booming period for computer departments of 
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the largest Spanish firms. However, that rise is not exclusive tor IT service providers in 
the national market (which is no longer static but in a slight downward trend): The 
offshore outsourcing of IT services also benefits from this rise (Peslak, 2012).  
The most important Spanish firms continue to perform selective outsourcing, 
thus following previous studies’ recommendations (Lacity et al., 1996). Firms only 
outsource some of the activities performed in their IS services. Furthermore, the most 
commonly outsourced activities are the least specific and most standard ones. These 
activities require less service addressee’s direct attention, and many providers are 
available. Furthermore, these activities are not excessively complex or strategically 
critical (Ali & Green, 2009; Fisher et al., 2008; Thouin et al., 2009).  
From the longitudinal point of view, the results show that the activities that firms 
outsource the most are the same in 2013 than in previous years. In addition, even though 
the outsourcing levels for the different activities are generally below 50%, those levels 
increase over time, which suggests that a stable tendency to outsource exists among 
Spanish firms. Furthermore, firms tend to outsource mostly at firm level. 
Although firms look for more than one provider for outsourced activities, as they 
also did in the previous years, having multiple providers is less common nowadays.  
A tendency to maintain fixed prices exists, though firms also prefer contracts dependent 
on service units received. Contracts where the price stems from service cost are the last 
option for firms. Regarding contract duration, firms prefer short-term contracts (Currie, 
1998; Earl, 1996; Gellings, 2007). This same preference shows in the findings of 
previous years. However, firms are no longer so reluctant to longer-lasting contracts, 
and the difference between short-term or longer-term contracts preference is not as 
wide. Regarding resources ownership, the largest Spanish firms still prefer to own both 
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the hardware and the software, and are in favor of implementing the services in their 
own premises, which once again follows the trends from the preceding surveys.  
With regard to the commercial relationship between the participant firms, the IS 
service clients and their providers, these entities usually behave as separate 
organizations that act in accordance with specific outsourcing contracts. The cases in 
which the client owns part of the provider firm’s capital or the provider is a subsidiary 
or affiliate of the client are much less common. This trend shows a behavior that is 
statistically similar to 2006 survey findings.  
This study concludes that continuity in the outsourcing tendencies exists over 
time, as the previous surveys support. This study also concludes that a higher maturity 
of IS outsourcing exists, and that this maturity draws on: (1) A greater number of firms 
that carry out outsourcing, which is especially due to the growth of offshore 
outsourcing— an infrequent trend in the preceding surveys. (2) A higher degree of 
outsourcing for practically every IS service activity. (3) A less noticeable tendency to 
have many providers, which could be due to the strengthening of relationships with the 
latter. (4) A lower disproportion in the ways of fixing prices, which increasingly 
become service units and cost-based. This lower disproportion could reflect greater trust 
in the providers and in the services. (5) Higher use of, and less distrust toward longer-
lasting contracts. 
This study contributes to the literature by incorporating a longitudinal analysis, 
whereas most of the existing research on outsourcing focus on a specific point in time. 
The longitudinal vision can provide a fresher perspective (Dibbern et al., 2004). In 
addition, most longitudinal works on IS outsourcing are case studies (Brege at al., 2010; 
De Looff, 1995; Fisher et al., 2008; Kishore et al., 2003; Willcocks et al., 1999), and 
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this study is a survey-based research, which in turn replicates two previous surveys, and 
allows for more generalizable outcomes.  
This study also haves some limitations: although this is the third survey on the 
same topic, some data are only available in the 2013 and 2006 surveys, but not in the 
2001 survey. Thus, further research should measure the development of these 
characteristics over time in other countries, regions, or in specific firms to assess the 
maturity level at IS outsourcing, and to help to carry out a more in-depth reflection on 
the characteristics of IS outsourcing contracts, which have become an inescapable 
reality in today’s business management.
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Table 1. Studies’ technical specifications 
 2001 2006 2013 
Scope Spain Spain Spain 
Population 
4,416 largest 
Spanish firms 
4,107 largest 
Spanish firms 
4,955 largest 
Spanish firms 
Sample Size 
357 valid answers 
(8.08%) 
329 valid answers 
(8.02%) 
398 valid answers 
(8.03%) 
Sampling error 5% 5% 4.7% 
Survey date June-October, 2001 
September-
December, 2006 
October 2012-
February 2013 
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Table 2. National and global outsourcing, 2013 
 Global outsourcing   
No Yes Total Chi-square Sign. 
 
National 
out. 
No 54 
(68.4%) 
25 (31.6%) 79 (100%) 
0.399 0.528 
Yes 206 
(64.6%) 
113 (35.4%) 319 (100%) 
Total 260 
(65.3%) 
138 (34.7%) 398 (100%) 
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Table 3. Outsourcing level (longitudinal) 
 
2001 2006 2013 
N % N % N % 
National 
outsourcing  
No 51 14.3 54 16.4 79 19.8 
Yes 306 85.7 275 83.6 319 80.2 
Global 
outsourcing  
No - - 275 83.6 260 65.3 
Yes - - 54 16.4 138 34.7 
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Figure 1. Outsourced activities (longitudinal) 
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Figure 2. Several providers (longitudinal) 
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Figure 3. Price structure (longitudinal) 
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Figure 4. Outsourcing contract duration percentages (longitudinal) 
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Figure 5. Resource ownership (longitudinal) 
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Figure 6. Commercial relationship (longitudinal) 
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